


# Subvector Commitments with Optimal Opening Complexity

Estonian-Latvian CS Theory Days 2026

**Matteo Campanelli**

Offchain Labs & University of Tartu

[binarywhales.com](https://binarywhales.com)



Link to paper

# **Prelude: “Traditional” Cryptographic Hashing**

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$H(\boxed{01010101100\dots011})$

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$H(\boxed{01010101100\dots011}) \longrightarrow$



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**Security:** “different strings will have different fingerprints”

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$H(\boxed{01010101100\dots011})$   $\longrightarrow$



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$H(\boxed{11010101100\dots011})$

# Prelude: “Traditional” Cryptographic Hashing

$H(\boxed{01010101100\dots011})$   $\longrightarrow$



**Security:** “different strings will have different fingerprints”

$H(\boxed{11010101100\dots011})$

$H(\boxed{01010101100\dots001})$

# Prelude: “Traditional” Cryptographic Hashing

$H(\boxed{01010101100\dots011})$   $\longrightarrow$




**Security:** “different strings will have different fingerprints”

$H(\boxed{11010101100\dots011})$

$H(\boxed{01010101100\dots001})$

$H(\boxed{01011101100\dots011})$

# Prelude: “Traditional” Cryptographic Hashing



**Security:** “different strings will have different fingerprints”

$H([11010101100\dots011])$




$H([01010101100\dots001])$



$H([01011101100\dots011])$



# Prelude: “Traditional” Cryptographic Hashing



**Security:** “different strings will have different fingerprints”

$H([11010101100\dots011])$



$H([01010101100\dots001])$




$H([01011101100\dots011])$




Hashing has a ton of applications to *integrity* in computer systems and in cryptography in general

# Limitations of Traditional Hashing




# Limitations of Traditional Hashing

A curious user



# Limitations of Traditional Hashing

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**Cryptographic hash function** 31 languages

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
This article **needs additional citations for verification**. Please help [improve this article](#) by [adding citations to reliable sources](#). Unsourced material may be challenged and removed.  
*Find sources: "Cryptographic hash function" – news · newspapers · books · scholar · JSTOR (May 2016)*  
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Hashing is a one-directional mathematical operation which is quick to calculate, yet hard to reverse.<sup>[1]</sup> So password storage and digital signatures benefit from hashes.<sup>[2]</sup> Even a small change in the input results in a very

```
graph LR; Input[Fox] --> Function[cryptographic hash function]; Function --> Digest["DFCD 3454 BBEA 788A 751A  
696C 24D9 7009 CA99 2D17"]
```

# Limitations of Traditional Hashing

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**Cryptographic hash function** 31 languages  
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**Ackermann function** 27 languages  
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*This article is about the mathematical function. For other uses, see [Ackermann \(disambiguation\)](#).*


In [computability theory](#), the **Ackermann function**, named after [Wilhelm Ackermann](#), is one of the simplest<sup>[1]</sup> and earliest-discovered examples of a [total computable function](#) that is not [primitive recursive](#). All primitive recursive functions are total and computable, but the Ackermann function illustrates that not all total computable functions are primitive recursive. It is essentially constructed by diagonalizing a sequence of primitive recursive functions  $f_1, f_2, \dots$  selected from the [Grzegorzcyk hierarchy](#). This makes the Ackermann function the first limit point  $f_\omega$  of the [fast-growing hierarchy](#).

**Digest**

cryptographic hash function	→	DFCD 3454 BBEA 788A 751A 696C 24D9 7009 CA99 2D17
-----------------------------	---	--

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**Busy beaver** 🌐 14 languages  
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*For other uses of Busy Beaver or Busy Beavers, see [Busy beaver \(disambiguation\)](#).*

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
- This article **may be too technical for most readers to understand.** *(October 2016)*
- This article **has an unclear citation style.** *(July 2024)*

In [theoretical computer science](#), the **busy beaver game** aims to find a terminating [program](#) of a given size that (depending on definition) either


**Digest**  
Cryptographic hash function → DFCD 3454 BBEA 788A 751A 696C 24D9 7009 CA99 2D17

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


A collage of three Wikipedia article snippets. The top snippet is for 'Cryptographic hash function', showing the title, language options (31 languages), and a 'Digest' box with a cryptographic hash example: 'DFCD 3454 BBEA 788A 751A 696C 24D9 7009 CA99 2D17'. The middle snippet is for 'Ackermann function', showing a disambiguation note: 'This article is about the mathematical function. For other uses, see Ackermann (disambiguation)'. The bottom snippet is for 'Busy beaver', showing a 'This article has multiple issues' warning box with two points: 'This article may be too technical for most readers to understand. (October 2016)' and 'This article has an unclear citation style. (July 2024)'. The bottom snippet also shows the start of the definition: 'In theoretical computer science, the busy beaver game aims to find a terminating program of a given size that (depending on definition) either'.



# Limitations of Traditional Hashing

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
A collage of three Wikipedia article snippets. The top snippet is for 'Cryptographic hash function' with 31 languages available. The middle snippet is for 'Ackermann function' with 27 languages available, including a 'Digest' box showing a cryptographic hash: 'DFCD 3454 BBEA 788A 751A 696C 24D9 7009 CA99 2D17'. The bottom snippet is for 'Busy beaver' with 14 languages available, featuring a 'This article has multiple issues' warning box with two points: 'This article may be too technical for most readers to understand. (October 2016)' and 'This article has an unclear citation style. (July 2024)'. The bottom snippet also shows the beginning of a paragraph: 'In theoretical computer science, the busy beaver game aims to find a terminating program of a given size that (depending on definition) either'.



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# Limitations of Traditional Hashing

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of the whole  
Wikipedia corpus

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
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


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*Can we use hashing to check those pages actually come from the Wikipedia corpus?*

# Limitations of Traditional Hashing

A curious user



A trusted hash of the whole Wikipedia corpus

$$H(\text{Wikipedia Corpus}) \stackrel{?}{=} \text{Fingerprint}$$

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


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


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
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
Not the solution we were looking for

# **Subvector Commitments (SVC) [LY10,CF13,LM19]**

**A Fine-Grained Form of Hashing**


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
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## A Fine-Grained Form of Hashing



# Subvector Commitments (SVC) [LY10,CF13,LM19]


## A Fine-Grained Form of Hashing



Usually called "Commit".  
Simplified to "Hash" here.

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


Commitment to F  
("hash of F")

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
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
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



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


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



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


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



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


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



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


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



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


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



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


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



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


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



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


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



# Subvector Commitments (SVC) [LY10,CF13,LM19]

## A Fine-Grained Form of Hashing




Usually called "Commit".  
Simplified to "Hash" here.





# Subvector Commitments (SVC) [LY10,CF13,LM19]

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
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

# Subvector Commitments (SVC) [LY10,CF13,LM19]

## A Fine-Grained Form of Hashing

Key efficiency requirements.



Usually called "Commit".  
Simplified to "Hash" here.




$\boxed{01010101100\dots011}$

# Subvector Commitments (SVC) [LY10,CF13,LM19]



## A Fine-Grained Form of Hashing

**Key efficiency requirements.**

- $\pi$  is short. Ideally  $|\pi| = O(1)$ .



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


# Subvector Commitments (SVC) [LY10,CF13,LM19]



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# Applications of SVC

# Applications of SVC

- Transparency Logs

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- Transparency Logs
- Verifiable Databases

# Applications of SVC



- Transparency Logs
- Verifiable Databases

DB

STORE		
Store_key	City	Region
1	New York	East
2	Chicago	Central
3	Atlanta	East
4	Los Angeles	West
5	San Francisco	West
6	Philadelphia	East
.	.	.

PRODUCT		
Product_key	Description	Brand
1	Beautiful Girls	MKF Studios
2	Toy Story	Wolf
3	Sense and Sensibility	Parabuster Inc.
4	Holiday of the Year	Wolf
5	Pulp Fiction	MKF Studios
6	The Juror	MKF Studios
7	From Dusk Till Dawn	Parabuster Inc.
8	Hellraiser: Bloodline	Big Studios
.	.	.

SALES_FACT				
Store_key	Product_key	Sales	Cost	Profit
1	6	2.39	1.15	1.24
1	2	16.7	6.91	9.79
2	7	7.16	2.75	4.40
3	2	4.77	1.84	2.93
5	3	11.93	4.59	7.34
5	1	14.31	5.51	8.80
.	.	.	.	.



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- Transparency Logs
- Verifiable Databases


DB

STORE		
Store_key	City	Region
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.	.	.	.	.

`SELECT SUM(price) FROM Transaction  
WHERE account_id = '5938' AND trade_date = '2025-01-01'`



# Applications of SVC

- Transparency Logs
- Verifiable Databases

# Applications of SVC

- Transparency Logs
- Verifiable Databases
- Proofs of Space

# Applications of SVC

- Transparency Logs
- Verifiable Databases
- Proofs of Space
- Compiling PCPs\* into Argument Systems


\* Probabilistically Checkable Proofs

# Applications of SVC

- Transparency Logs
- Verifiable Databases
- Proofs of Space
- Compiling PCPs\* into Argument Systems
- “Stateless” blockchains

\* Probabilistically Checkable Proofs

# Focus of This Work




# Focus of This Work


Recall:

**Key efficiency requirements.**

- $\pi$  is short. Ideally  $|\pi| = O(1)$ .
- $\text{Time}(\text{Verify}) \approx |\text{subvector}|$



$\text{SVC.Verify}(\text{fingerprint}_F, \text{subvec}, \text{indices}, \pi)$




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
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


# Focus of This Work


Recall:

**Key efficiency requirements.**


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# Focus of This Work




# Focus of This Work




# Focus of This Work

Obtaining SVCs with *optimal* proving time.




# Intermezzo: What is the Optimal Proving Time in SVC?



# Intermezzo: What is the Optimal Proving Time in SVC?

set of indices  $J$


input




of size  $N$

01010101100...011


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
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
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
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input



of size  $N$


01010101100...011

# Intermezzo: What is the Optimal Proving Time in SVC?

The preprocessing/aggregation framework:

set of indices  $J$

input



of size  $N$

01010101100...011

# Intermezzo: What is the Optimal Proving Time in SVC?

## The preprocessing/aggregation framework:

In some offline stage:

Preprocess 01010101100...011

precomputing all “singleton” proofs.


set of indices  $J$

input

$\pi_{\{1\}}$   $\pi_{\{2\}}$  ...  $\pi_{\{N\}}$

of size N

01010101100...011



# Intermezzo: What is the Optimal Proving Time in SVC?

## The preprocessing/aggregation framework:

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
Preprocess 01010101100...011  
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$\pi_{\{1\}}$   $\pi_{\{2\}}$  ...  $\pi_{\{N\}}$

Later:

set of indices  $J$

input



of size  $N$

01010101100...011

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
input

$\pi_{\{1\}}$   $\pi_{\{2\}}$  ...  $\pi_{\{N\}}$

$\pi_J$

of size  $N$

$01010101100\dots011$



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
$\pi_{\{1\}}$   $\pi_{\{2\}}$  ...  $\pi_{\{N\}}$

$\pi_J$

To make a proof, it will select and aggregate (through some specific algorithm) only the relevant  $|J|$  proofs.

of size N

$01010101100\dots011$



# Intermezzo: What is the Optimal Proving Time in SVC?

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
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Later:

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input



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$\pi_J$

To make a proof, it will select and aggregate (through some specific algorithm) only the relevant  $|J|$  proofs.

→ Makes it possible to prove in time  $o(N)$ .

of size  $N$

01010101100...011

# Intermezzo: What is the Optimal Proving Time in SVC?

**So the optimal prover would be one strictly linear in  $|J|$ .**


**The preprocessing/aggregation framework:**

In some offline stage:

Preprocess 01010101100...011  
precomputing all “singleton” proofs.

Later:

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$\pi_{\{1\}}$   $\pi_{\{2\}}$  ...  $\pi_{\{N\}}$

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$\pi_{\{1\}}$   $\pi_{\{2\}}$  ...  $\pi_{\{N\}}$

To make a proof, it will select and aggregate (through some specific algorithm) only the relevant  $|J|$  proofs.

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
**So the optimal prover would be one strictly linear in  $|J|$ .**

**Yet, no prior construction has this efficiency profile.**

Later:

set of indices  $J$


input



of size  $N$


01010101100...011

# Main Result of This Work




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First SVC with  $\Theta(|J|)$  proving time.



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


# Main Result of This Work

First SVC with  $\Theta(|J|)$  proving time.

scalar ops in  $\mathbb{F}$

set of indices  $J$



$\pi_{\{1\}} \dots \pi_{\{N\}}$

Prove( $J$ )  $\rightarrow \pi_J$

$\boxed{F} \in \mathbb{F}^N$


# Main Result of This Work

scalar ops in  $\mathbb{F}$

**First SVC with  $\Theta(|J|)$  proving time.**

(this is without sacrificing bandwidth\*: it has  $O(1)$  commitment and proof size)

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$\pi_{\{1\}} \dots \pi_{\{N\}}$

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\*nor verification time—more in a second.


# Main Result of This Work

First SVC with  $\Theta(|J|)$  proving time.

(this is without sacrificing bandwidth\*: it has  $O(1)$  commitment and proof size)

$$|cm| = |\pi| = 1 |\mathbb{G}_1|$$

set of indices  $J$




$$\pi_{\{1\}} \dots \pi_{\{N\}}$$

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# Main Result of This Work



Our setting is elliptic curves with bilinear pairings. [pic credit: Diego Aranha]


scalar ops in  $\mathbb{F}$

## First SVC with $\Theta(|J|)$ proving time.

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
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scalar ops in  $\mathbb{F}$


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(this is without sacrificing bandwidth\*: it has  $O(1)$  commitment and proof size)

$$|cm| = |\pi| = 1 |\mathbb{G}_1|$$

*“Cute asymptotics you got there—but why would I care?”*

set of indices  $J$



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
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- **Concretely faster**

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Asymptotics are due to Pippenger's algorithm. Concretely at least  $\approx 40x$  slower

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We want to commit to  $a_1, \dots, a_n$

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
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
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## qedb: Expressive and Modular Verifiable Databases (without SNARKs)

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